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Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation 





In this article, we analyze Auerbach's (1991) proposal of a retrospective capital gains tax, 
which is equivalent to an accrual tax on an ex-ante basis. Using a continuous-time model with 
stochastic interest rates, we prove that equivalence holds even if the risk-free asset return is 
correlated with other risky assets' returns. However, equivalence fails to hold on an ex-post 
basis. In other words, if an investor faces a huge gain (loss), the effective tax rate under this 
system is less (higher) than that what would be due under an accrual tax system. This leads to 
a fairness problem. For this reason, we also find the conditions that ensure equivalence on an 
ex-post basis. As will be shown, however, ex-post equivalence can be achieved only if a huge 
amount of information is available, making its implementation a hard task. 
JEL Code: H25, H32. 
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Capital gains can be taxed either at accrual or at realization. The former
method is preferable from a fairness point of view, as it taxes capital gains
when they accrue, thereby providing a more precise measure of a taxpayer￿ s
ability to pay. Under this system, the taxpayer should ￿ll an income tax
return accounting for all changes in the assets￿values. This would be easy
if, during this period, shares were sold to other shareholders. Otherwise,
the taxpayer would have to calculate changes in his/her portfolio on the
basis of data that is often imprecise. In particular, it would not be easy
to evaluate an asset that is not publicly traded (see Green and Sheshinski,
1979).1 Given this limitation, most countries have therefore opted for a
realization-based capital gains tax.2 However, under this method, an investor
is "locked-in", i.e., is encouraged to delay selling assets to save taxes (see,
e.g., Constantinides, 1983).
In order to neutralize the lock-in e⁄ect and at the same time, implement
a realization-based system, Auerbach (1991) proposes a retrospective capital
gains tax device, which raises the e⁄ective tax burden if realization is post-
poned. He shows that this system is equivalent to an accrual method on an
ex-ante perspective. By denoting this equivalence as holding-period neutral-
ity, he proves that an investor is no longer encouraged to delay realization.
Moreover, the Auerbach tax overcomes the informational problems arising
from Vickrey￿ s (1939) original proposal, which required the availability of in-
formation on past assets￿price. Indeed, the retrospective tax formula simply
requires asset￿ s current price and the spot interest rate during the holding
period.3
Auerbach￿ s (1991) proposal su⁄ers from at least two limitations. Firstly,
1The accrual method has another limitation if an investor is subject to liquidity con-
straints. As the tax burden may occur in a period when the taxpayer matures but does
not realize the capital gains, a liquidity problem could arise. For instance, the taxpayer
might be forced to sell part of his/her assets, against his/her own wishes, in order to pay
the taxes.
2Italy is one of the few exceptions that implemented the accrual method for the manage-
ment of non-quali￿ed shareholdings in listed companies (see Bonzani et al., 2002; Alworth
et al., 2003).
3Auerbach and Bradford (2004) merge Auerbach￿ s (1991) and Bradford￿ s (1997) ￿nd-
ings and obtain a generalized cash-￿ ow tax system. They show that from both an investor￿ s
and the government￿ s point of view, their joint proposal is equivalent to a pure accrual
tax system on an ex-ante basis.
1it is based on the assumption that the risk-free interest rate is deterministic,
although he states that the quality of results does not change if the risk-free
asset is a "zero-beta" one, i.e., "carries no risk premium" (footnote 2, p.
169). Auerbach (1991) also implicitly assumes that risky asset returns are
serially uncorrelated, i.e., evolve according to a random walk. As pointed
out by Fama and French (2004) however, the "zero-beta" assumption is not
supported by empirical evidence. As shown, e.g., by Shiller and Beltratti
(1992), there is a negative correlation between stock returns and changes in
interest rates. Peersman and Smets (2005) also show that monetary policy
may deeply a⁄ect stock market returns. In particular, interest rate pegging
strategies by central bankers have a heterogeneous impact on industries￿re-
turns. Moreover, Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Campbell (2008) show
that excess stock returns can be predicted by means of lagged ￿nancial vari-
ables.
The second limitation of the retrospective tax device is given by the ab-
sence of ex-post equivalence. In other words, if an investor faces a huge gain,
the e⁄ective tax rate under this system is less than that what would be due
under an accrual tax system. The converse is true if an investor faces a loss.
Auerbach (1991) argues that the absence of ex-post equivalence may be a
problem in terms of fairness. In order to tackle this issue, Kaplow (1994)
applies a two-period model and shows that the retrospective tax is neutral
from an ex-post perspective, if the government can implement an optimal
portfolio strategy. The reasoning behind this result is as follows: if the gov-
ernment can make the same portfolio strategies as individual investors (in
each state of the world), it is therefore able to make the investors￿actual net
positions the same as they would be under an accrual tax.4 A similar result
can be obtained by letting ￿scal policy be state-contingent, in line with Zhu
(1992).
In this article we deal with Auerbach￿ s proposal, by assuming a more
realistic framework where the spot interest rate is stochastic and may be cor-
related with risky asset returns. Moreover, we account for Kaplow￿ s caveat
that "[a]llowing many periods [...] makes the de￿nition and practical imple-
mentation of ex ante and ex post concepts more complex" (footnote 14, p.
797). For this reason, we will apply a continuous-time framework.
We have two results. Firstly, we will show that ex-ante holding-period
neutrality holds in a more realistic setting, where the risk-free asset is not
4For further details see Weisbach (2004).
2necessarily a "zero-beta" security. Secondly, we will prove that ex-post equiv-
alence can be achieved by applying a state-contingent tax rule. To do so,
however, we need information not only on current but also on past prices: this
leads to the same critique raised on Vickrey￿ s (1939) proposal and therefore,
su⁄ers from severe implementation problems.
The structure of this article is as follows. Section 2 introduces and dis-
cusses the assumptions of the model used to address the capital gains tax
problem. Section 3 contains the equivalence results on both an ex-ante and
ex-post basis. Section 4 summarizes our ￿ndings and discusses their policy
implications.
2 A continuous-time model
In line with Auerbach (1991), we introduce a partial-equilibrium model, with
continuous time. For simplicity, we assume the existence of only two assets:
a risk-free asset and a risky one.
We de￿ne S (t) and r(t) as the price of the risky asset and the spot interest
rate of the risk-free asset at time t, respectively. In a complete market we
therefore have









; 8t ￿ T; (1)
where Q is the (unique) risk-neutral probability.
Although the debate on ￿nancial phenomena is still lively and contro-
versial, we cannot disregard the fact that there may be non-zero correlation
between interest rates and risky assets, and/or some serial correlation on
asset returns.5 For this reason we introduce the following:
Assumption 1 The value of the risky asset evolves as follows:
dS (t)
S (t)






; S (t0) = S0 > 0; (2)
5Canova and De Nicol￿ (2003) focus on G-7 countries and ￿nd that "real equity returns
and the real risk-free rate do not signi￿cantly move together" (p. 227). However, they
show that over certain subsamples, there is a signi￿cantly negative correlation between
these variables. Moreover, when they account for price dynamics, they ￿nd a negative
correlation between the real risk-free rate and price dynamics. Ang and Bekaert (2007)
show that interest rates (rather than other past ￿nancial variables) can predict stock
returns.
3where S0 is known at time t0, ￿ (t;S)
0 ￿ (t;S) 2 R is the variance of an
asset￿ s instantaneous return, W Q (t) is a k dimension Wiener process under
the risk-neutral probability measure Q, and the prime denotes transposition.
Assumption 2 The spot interest rate r(t) evolves as follows:







where ￿r (t;r) and ￿r (t;r) are the drift and the instantaneous standard de-
viation, respectively.
According to Assumption 1, the dynamics of S (t) may be characterized by
serial correlation. Assumption 2 lets the spot rate be stochastic. According
to Merton (1973), the risk-free asset should be denoted as "instantaneously
risk-less asset" (p. 874). In other words, the risk-free interest rate is known
ahead of time for one instant dt (from t to t + dt). However, it may change
later (i.e., at time t + 2dt), and is therefore unknown in the future.6
Let us next ￿nd the conditions that make a realization-based system
equivalent to an accrual one from either an ex-ante and ex-post perspective.
Denoting the tax factor as ￿(t) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿c (t) ￿ 1, where ￿c (t) is the e⁄ective
capital gains tax rate at time t, and assuming that a risky asset is bought at
time t0 and sold at t > t0, the after-tax value is equal to
S (t)￿(t):
Given the statutory tax rate on interest income ￿, we can write the following:
De￿nition 1 On an ex-ante basis, a retrospective tax device and an accrual








= (1 ￿ ￿)r(t)dt: (4)
In line with Auerbach (1991), De￿nition 1 says that ex-ante equivalence
holds if the after-tax return on asset S (t) is, on average, equal to the after-tax
return on the risk-free asset, i.e., (1 ￿ ￿)r(t).
6The dynamics of the risk-free rate can also be examined in a general equilibrium
model. See, e.g., Vasicek (2005). For a discussion of the equilibrium interest rate under a
comprehensive income tax regime see Menoncin and Panteghini (2008).
4Given Assumptions 1 and 2, however, the likelihood that the after-tax
return
d(￿(t)S(t))
￿(t)S(t) is just equal to (1 ￿ ￿)r(t) is nil. This means that tax
liabilities may di⁄er on an ex-post basis. For this reason we also introduce
the following:
De￿nition 2 On an ex-post basis, the retrospective tax device is equivalent
to an accrual system if
d(￿(t)S (t))
￿(t)S (t)
= (1 ￿ ￿)r(t)dt: (5)
According to De￿nition 2, ex-post equivalence holds if the after-tax return
on asset S (t), under Q, is equal to the after-tax return on the risk-free asset,
in any state of the world. In this case, tax liabilities are always the same.
3 Equivalence results
Let us next ￿nd the conditions under which equivalence is met. To do so, we
let the tax factor evolve as follows:
d￿(t)
￿(t)
= ￿￿ (t)dt + ￿￿ (t)
0 dW
Q; (6)
where ￿￿ (t) and ￿￿ (t) are two tax tools. In particular, ￿￿ (t) is a drift com-
ponent that can be chosen by the government to let the tax factor follow a
deterministic trend. By adjusting ￿￿ (t), a policymaker can therefore imple-
ment a deterministic rule and obtain the ex-ante-equivalence condition (4).
The term ￿￿ (t) is a state-contingent tool that can o⁄set any shock dW Q.
This means that, by choosing ￿￿ (t), a government can achieve condition (6)
and thus obtain ex-post equivalence.
Using rule (6) we can prove the following:
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+(￿ (t;S) + ￿￿ (t))
0 dW
Q:








= (1 ￿ ￿)r(t)dt =
￿





If we set ￿￿ (t) = 0 and rearrange (9) we obtain ￿￿ (t) = ￿￿r(t): Substitut-
ing this result into (6) gives the deterministic rule (7). The proposition is
therefore proven.
Proposition 1 derives a su¢ cient condition for ex-ante equivalence to hold.
In particular, solving (9) gives the same deterministic rule as that obtained
by Auerbach (1991), i.e.,




where ￿a (t) is monotonically decreasing in time.7 This implies that Auer-
bach￿ s (1991) result holds in a more general setting, where the risk-free asset
must not be a zero-beta security and risky asset returns may be serially cor-
related. The reasoning behind this result is simple: as shown in the proof of
Proposition 1, if we set ￿￿ (t) = 0, we obtain a deterministic rules that just
requires knowledge of variables r(t) and S (t): Since both are known at time
t, correlation does not matter.
It is worth noting that Auerbach and Bradford (2004) addressed the im-
plementation problems arising from the stochastic dynamics of interest rates.
They proposed two alternative systems, both aimed at calculating the tax
liability on ex-post basis. In line with Bradford￿ s (1997) proposal, one pos-
sibility would be to postpone resolving the tax liability until the arrival of
a gain reference date. An alternative option would be to choose a gain ref-
erence date that would always be in the past for the a⁄ected investor. Of
course, Proposition 1 shows that these devices are not necessary in order for
ex-ante equivalence to hold.
7Auerbach￿ s (1991) Eq. (6) (on p. 170) is equal to (10).
6As pointed out rule (7) does not ensure ex-post equivalence. To see this
we apply It￿￿ s lemma to (10) and ￿nd
d(S (t)￿a (t))
S (t)￿a (t)
= (1 ￿ ￿)r(t)dt + ￿ (t;S)
0 dW
Q (t):
This means that, under a retrospective system, if an investor faces a huge
gain (i.e., dW Q (t) > 0), the e⁄ective tax burden is less than what would
be due under an accrual tax, and vice versa. In order to ensure the same
after-tax return in any state of the world, a policymaker should implement
a state-contingent tax. Using De￿nition 2 we can prove the following:
Proposition 2 Denoting ￿p (t) as the relevant tax factor, ex-post equivalence





￿￿r(t) + ￿ (t;S)
0 ￿ (t;S)
￿
dt ￿ ￿ (t;S)
0 dW
Q (t); (11)
￿p (t0) = 1:
Proof. Condition (5) holds if, given (8), the following equality holds
d(￿(t)S (t))
￿(t)S (t)
= (1 ￿ ￿)r(t)dt =
￿




+(￿ (t;S) + ￿￿ (t))
0 dW
Q:
This means that (12) holds only if the drift and di⁄usion coe¢ cients ￿￿ (t)
and ￿￿ (t) are such that
￿ (t;S) + ￿￿ (t) = 0;
r(t) + ￿￿ (t) + ￿ (t;S)
0 ￿￿ (t) = (1 ￿ ￿)r(t):
Rearranging this two-equation system gives
￿￿ (t) = ￿￿ (t;S);
￿￿ (t) = ￿￿r(t) + ￿ (t;S)
0 ￿ (t;S):
Substituting these results into (6) gives (11). The proposition is therefore
proven.
Proposition 2 derives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for ex-post
equivalence to hold. As can be seen, rule (11) is state-contingent, since
7the equality ￿￿ (t) = ￿￿ (t;S) must hold. In other words, the tax tool ￿￿ (t)
is such that any asset price shock is just o⁄set, so that the actual return is
always (1 ￿ ￿)r(t) in any time interval (1 ￿ ￿)r(t). Solving the stochastic
di⁄erential equation (11) gives






As can be seen in (13), the calculation of ￿p (t) requires the knowledge of
past asset prices. Moreover, we need to know the value of ￿ (s;S) for any
s 2 [t0;t]. This is extremely di¢ cult. Of course the equivalence result is
an even harder task if: i) risky asset returns are heteroschedastic (i.e., ￿
depends on S) and ii) some assets are not listed. In sum we can say that the
state-contingent rule (12) is informationally very demanding and is therefore
to the same critique as that based on Vickrey￿ s (1939) original proposal.
4 Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed Auerbach￿ s (1991) proposal of a retrospective
capital gains tax. Using a continuous-time model, with stochastic interest
rates, we have both good and bad news. The good news is that ex-ante
holding-period neutrality holds in a more realistic framework, where the risk-
free interest rate is correlated with risky asset returns. Contrary to what
Auerbach and Bradford (2004) maintain, no ad hoc adjustments are needed
to account for the stochastic dynamics of interest rates. The bad news is
that, due to severe information problems, designing a state-contingent rule
that ensures ex-post equivalence is a hard task.
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